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Krebs: Any Man Can Be a Father, but Should a Dead Man Be a Dad: An Appro

NOTE

ANY MAN CAN BE A FATHER, BUT SHOULD A
DEAD MAN BE A DAD?: AN APPROACH TO THE

FORMAL LEGALIZATION OF POSTHUMOUS
SPERM RETRIEVAL AND POSTHUMOUS
REPRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
"When [posthumous conception] occurs without the [deceased]
person's consent, it deprives an individual of the opportunity to be the
conclusive author of a highly significant chapter in his or her life."
- Anne Reichman Schiff1
On December 20, 2014, New York City Police Officer Wenjian Liu
was murdered while stationed in his patrol car.2 On July 25, 2017, he
became the father of his first and only child.3 Though Officer Liu was
pronounced dead at the hospital on that fateful night, his wife, Pei Xia
("Sanny") Liu was able to keep one part of him alive. 4 When doctors
asked Sanny if she wanted to have her husband's sperm retrieved from
his corpse and frozen, she said "yes."5 That same night, Sanny had a
dream where she "saw an image of Wenjian Liu wearing a white robe
and handing her a child, a girl." 6 Shortly after his death, she began to

1. Anne Reichman Schiff, Posthumous Conception and the Need for Consent: We Should
Require Prior Consent to Safeguard the Interests of the Deceased, 170 MED. J. AUSTL. 53, 53

(1999).
2. Al Baker & Benjamin Mueller, Two Officers, Ambushed, Are Killed in Brooklyn, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 21, 2014, at Al, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/two-police-officersshot-in-their-patrol-car-in-brooklyn.html.
3. Joseph Goldstein, Daughter of Slain Police Officer Is Born, Two Years After Her Father's
Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2017, at A23, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/nyregion/

daughter-of-slain-police-officer-is-bom-2-years-after-fathers-death.html.
4. Id.
5. Mary Murphy, A Miracle of Science Brings Smiles to NYPD Grandparents Whose Only
Son Was Assassinated, PIX11 (July 27, 2017), http://pixl 1.com/2017/07/27/a-miracle-of-science-

brings-smiles-to-nypd-grandparents-whose-only-son-was-assassinated.
6. Id.
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"quietly [start] the process of trying to conceive" their child. 7 Two-anda-half years later, she gave birth to their first child, a baby girl
named Angelina.8
Sanny Liu had multiple reasons that influenced her decision to
posthumously conceive Angelina. 9 First, Sanny decided to do this in
order to ease the grieving of her late husband's parents. 10 When
Angelina was born, Wenjian's parents were "very happy"-they "s[aw]
their son in the baby" and felt that "the top of [Angelina's] face look[ed]
like [her] father."1 1 It was the first time that news reporters had seen
Wenjian's mother smile since the death of her son.12 Second, Sanny
chose to do this in order to carry out the plans that she and Wenjian had
made for their life together. 3 The couple was only married for three
months at the time of the murder, and when she made the decision to
have her husband's sperm preserved, she did so with the intent that she
"might one day have [his] child."14 She was able to actualize their plans
of starting a family, and she has "not ruled out the possibility of giving
Angelina a little brother or sister in the future."' 5 Third, Sanny made this
decision to honor her late husband's memory.' 6 In an interview, she
explained that she "want[ed] him to have the child to carry on his
legacy ... [b]ecause [she] love[d] him."' 7
Various motivations for having children are represented through the
tale of Angelina Liu's birth.' 8 Whether the decision to bring children
into the world is made to instill happiness in grandparents, to create a
family of one's own, or to bestow honor upon someone's memory, it
often begins with the agreement of both parents.' 9 The ability to
7.

Id.

8. Id. The baby's name is derived from the word "angel" because the Liu family believes
that Wenjian is now an angel. Id.
9. See infra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
10. Murphy, supra note 5 ("Sanny quietly started the process of trying to conceive a
grandchild for the grieving parents .... ").
11. Goldstein, supra note 3, at A23.
12. Murphy, supra note 5.
13.

NYPD Detective Wenjian Liu 's Widow & New Mom: 'I Will Show My Daughter That Her

Father Was A Hero', CBS NEW YORK (July 31, 2017), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2017/
07/31/sanny-liu-interview ("The couple had always planned to have children, but their plans were
cut short when the detective's life was taken.").
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Sanny plans to carry on her late husband's memory by teaching her daughter about
him and the "ultimate sacrifice [that he made] to make this world a safer place." Id.
18. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
19. See generally Michael S. Broder, Resolving the Question of Whether or Not to Have
Children, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2013, 11:39 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
considerations
(discussing
michael-s-broder-phd/resolving-the-question-of b 3975478.html
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ascertain consent from the father, however, is greatly complicated when
he is deceased and has not left a will or an advance directive expressing
consent to posthumous fatherhood.20 What should occur when there are
conflicting accounts of the deceased's wishes? 2I How should a request
for retrieval be handled if it is made not by the spouse of the decedent
but by his partner, parents, or by his surviving children?2 2 Despite more
than three decades 23 of posthumous sperm retrieval ("PSR") and
posthumous reproduction ("PHR") occurring in the United States, there
are no state or federal laws in existence that govern either process.2 4
Furthermore, both PSR and PHR often occur in the wake of the sudden
death of a young man. Young people do not typically engage in
advanced care planning, and even when they do, their concern is what
would be left behind and not what could manifest in the future. 26 How
can the law raise awareness of PSR and PHR and generate meaningful
opportunities for men to explicitly consent to both?2 7
This Note proposes two legal solutions that allow both PSR and
PHR to occur while simultaneously respecting the deceased's ability to
be the "conclusive author ' 28 of the fatherhood chapter of his life.29 Part
II of this Note delves into the scientific and legal backgrounds of PSR
couples take into account before deciding to have children together).
20. Devon D. Williams, Over My Dead Body: The Legal Nightmare and Medical
Phenomenon of Posthumous Conception Through Postmortem Sperm Retrieval, 34 CAMPBELL L.
REv. 181, 191 (2011) ("The ambiguity of unwritten consent poses the biggest problem on the
threshold of PMSR-granting the initial request to extract sperm ....
").
21. See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Hall v. Fertility
Institute and the conflicting accounts presented of the decedent's desire to have children
posthumously with his girlfriend).
22. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text; notes 95-106 and accompanying text
(discussing both the conflict between the girlfriend and children of William Kane in Hecht v.
Superior Court and the wish of a mother to obtain son's sperm in the case of Sergeant Keivan
Cohen).
23. The first reported successful posthumous retrieval of sperm occurred in 1980. See Cappy
Miles Rothman, A Methodfor Obtaining Viable Sperm in the Postmortem State, 34 J. FERTILITY &
STERILITY 512, 512 (1980) (describing the first successful postmortem sperm retrieval procedure).
24. Sarah M. Bahm, Katrina Karkazis & David Magnus, A Content Analysis of Posthumous
Sperm Procurement Protocols with Considerationsfor Developing an Institutional Policy, 100 J.
FERTILITY & STERILITY 839, 840 (2013).

25. See infra Parts 11.B, ILI.C (discussing cases where young men whose sperm has been
posthumously retrieved have died suddenly as a result of motorcycle accidents, bar fights, and other
causes in their early twenties and thirties).
26. See Monica Mizzi, I'm Young and Healthy: Why Do I Need An Advance Health Care
Directive?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 13, 2017, 5:37 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/im-young-and-healthy-why-do-i-need-an-advance-healthcare us 58ef23cbe4b04cae050dc4ba
(highlighting the challenges of influencing young people to engage in advance care planning).
27. See infraPart V.B.
28. Schiff, supra note 1,at 53.
29. See infra Part IV.
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and PHR.3 ° It discusses the history of both procedures and reviews the
legal responses to each in France, England, Israel, and the United
States.3 1 Part III of this Note considers the legal and ethical dilemmas
that present in cases of PSR and PHR.32 Part IV recommends two
distinct legal solutions.3 3 The first legal solution endorses four
amendments to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 2006 ("UAGA")
that would explicitly address PSR and PHR and advocates for the
adoption of each amendment throughout all fifty states.34 The second
legal solution is intended to raise awareness of PSR and PHR and to
create a pathway for an explicit expression of consent to be given. 35 It
recommends that state driver's licenses be modified to include a section
for the cardholders to designate their wishes for their gametes and that
other forms of identification also be amended to include such a section
as well.36 Part V concludes this Note, hoping that the proposed legal
solutions are adopted in order to aid the living in carrying out the
reproductive wishes of the dead.37
II. SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF POSTHUMOUS SPERM
RETRIEVAL AND POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION

In order to fully comprehend the dilemmas that can arise in PSR
and PHR, both procedures must be understood from their scientific and
legal angles.38 Subpart II.A provides a scientific overview of PSR and
PHR.39 Subpart II.A then discusses the inception of each procedure, the
divergent categories of PSR, and the unique circumstances that prompt
both men and women to choose PSR and PHR.4 ° Subpart lI.B illustrates
the standards that could be employed by both physicians and judges
when contemplating whether or not to grant a request for PSR or PHR.41
It also provides insight into the forms that United States PSR and PHR
legislation could take through a review of prominent judicial cases and
legislative responses to PSR and PHR around the world.42 Subpart II.B
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV-V.
See infra Part ILA, l.B.
See infra Parts H.A.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part I.B.
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next examines the full ban in France, the need for explicit prior consent
in England, the implied consent standard in Israel, and the potential
implications of the In re Christy4 3 ruling on PSR and PHR in the United
States. 44 The compelling stories of PSR and PHR in Subpart II.B are
introduced to demonstrate that circumstances exist where the granting of
certain PSR and PHR requests seem to be, intuitively, more permissible
than the granting of others.4 5
A. Scientific Background
PSR occurs when sperm is extracted postmortem from a deceased
male.4 6 In 1980, Dr. Cappy Rothman reported the first successful PSR
procedure.47 He was able to retrieve the sperm of thirty-three year old
Robin Cranston, who died in an automobile accident.48 In order to
increase the likelihood that the decedent's sperm will be viable for PHR,
the sperm must be retrieved within the first twenty-four to thirty-six
hours after death. 49 Though this method of PSR is the primary focus of
this Note, it is also crucial to understand an additional method by which
sperm is posthumously retrieved, as it has been at the heart of numerous
legal battles.5" This second scenario of retrieval occurs when the
decedent's sperm is deposited into a sperm bank during his lifetime
and another person attempts to gain possession of that sperm after
his death.5 '
Though many men decide to deposit their sperm to earn
supplemental income or assist others in creating a family,52 others have
53
made this decision to preserve their own chances of fathering children.
43. In re Christy, Case No. EQV068545 (Johnson Cty. Iowa Sept. 13, 2007).
44. See infra Part I.B.
45. See infra Part II.B.
46. See Bahm, Karkazis & Magnus, supra note 24, at 839.
47. See Rothman, supra note 23, at 512. In this paper, Dr. Rothman, a urologist, presents "a
method... for obtaining sperm for... cryopreservation in the immediate postmortem state." Id.
48. Melissa Klein & Melkorka Licea, These Women Chose to Have Children With Their Dead
Husbands' Sperm, N.Y. POST (July 29, 2017), http://nypost.com/2Ol7/07/29/these-women-chose-tohave-children-with-their-dead-husbands-sperm; see also Justin Pritchard, Ex-Sen. Alan Cranston
Dead at 86, ABC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2000, 10:30 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
story?id = 122146.
49. Bahm, Karkazis & Magnus, supranote 24, at 839.
50. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
52. See Tamar Lewin, 10 Things to Know About Being a Sperm Donor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/health/sperm-donor-facts.html
(highlighting that
"[d]ozens of sperm banks across the country are recruiting men to help them build up a supply of
frozen sperm to meet the growing demand from women looking to start families ...[and] an active
donor who produces specimens twice a week might make $1,500 a month [from his deposits]").
53. Robert P. S. Jansen, Sperm and Ova as Property, 11 J. MED. ETH. 123, 125 (1985).
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Some men decide to store their sperm in a bank after being diagnosed
with a disease that can compromise their fertility.5 4 One such illness that
can cause this is cancer, where the chemotherapy and radiation used to
55
treat it have the potential to leave the afflicted man infertile. It is often
important to these men that they "preserve their genetic potential in the
event that they die as a result of their disease," and the men "take
comfort in the fact that [if] they have children, that it is not the end of
[their] road genetically."5 6 In the case of Woodward v. Commissioner of
Social Security, Warren Woodward made the decision to deposit his
57
sperm into a bank after learning that he had leukemia. Warren and his
wife, Lauren, had only been married for three-and-a-half years when
they discovered his illness, and they had no children together at the
time.58 After realizing that the treatment could render him sterile, the
couple made arrangements to have Warren's sperm banked and
preserved for PHR.5 9 Though Warren died nine months after his
6
diagnosis, Lauren gave birth to their twin girls two years later. "
In another instance, one man made the decision to deposit his sperm
because although he planned to take his own life, he did not want to
61
eliminate his chances of having children with his girlfriend. The case
of Hecht v. Superior Court centers around the postmortem reproductive
desires of William Kane, who committed suicide at the age of fortyeight. 62 Before he took his life, he made fifteen deposits of his sperm
into a bank, and his girlfriend, Deborah Hecht, accompanied him to the
bank six of these times. 63 His intention for these deposits was for
64
Deborah to be able to have their children after his death. William made
this intention for his sperm abundantly clear: "in his contract with the
Cryobank, in his will.., and in a suicide note to Ms. Hecht ... [a]nd he
65
reiterated his desire in a final letter to his two grown children., Though
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Author also notes the "anguish" that young adult men experience when facing an
untimely death from an "unfulfilment of their procreative instincts" and hypothesizes that the desire
to fulfill these procreative instincts might motivate more young men to designate their sperm for
PSR and PHR procedures during their lifetime. See id.
57. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
62. David Margolick, 15 Vials of Sperm: The Unusual Bequest of an Even More Unusual
Man, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 1994, at B18, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/29/us/15-vials-ofsperm-the-unusual-bequest-of-an-even-more-unusual-man.html.

63. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276; Margolick, supra note 62, at B18.
64. Margolick, supra note 62, at B18.
65. Id. His children, William Everett Kane Jr. and Katherine Kane, are from his previous
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Ms. Hecht desperately longed to have Mr. Kane's child, his former wife
and children opposed this, and went to court fighting to determine the
fate of the vials of sperm.66
PHR occurs when a decedent's gametes are used for fertilization
through artificial insemination after the decedent has died, and a child is
born as a result of this.67 Dr. Rothman was able to successfully achieve
the first pregnancy of PHR eighteen years after the first successful event
of PSR occurred.68 Dr. Rothman made the decision to aid a woman, who
decided to be inseminated with her husband's sperm fifteen months after
his sudden death, in order to give the family "hope and [to help them]
feel a little better" in the wake of his passing.6 9 There are multiple
reasons that a woman might choose to use PSR and PHR to conceive a
child. v She might believe that using the deceased's sperm would bring
honor to his memory and that conceiving his child posthumously would
aid her grieving.7 1 In addition, she might choose to engage in PHR so
that her future child would have a genetic connection with his or her
biological father, which could enable the child to have "more peace of
mind in knowing that he or she was conceived from a loving relationship
rather than from an unknown sperm donor."72

marriage to their mother, Sandra Irwin, who served as their lawyer in this case. Id. In the letter he
wrote to his children, William wrote that he has been "assiduously generating frozen sperm
samples" with the hopes that Deborah would decide to have a child by him after his death. Id.
66. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.
67. See John A. Robertson, Comment, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1027
(1994). Though the focus of this Note is on the use of sperm in posthumous reproduction, eggs have
been retrieved and used in posthumous reproduction as well. See generally Charles P. Kindregan,
Jr., Genetically Related Children:Harvesting of Gametesfrom Deceased or Incompetent Persons,7
J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 147, 149-50, 158-59 (2011) (discussing posthumous gamete retrieval and
posthumous reproduction in those who are not dead, but are incompetent to consent and/or have
experienced brain death). For a more in-depth discussion of the implications of posthumous egg
retrieval, see generally Jacqueline Clarke, Dying to Be Mommy: Using Intentional Parenthoodas a
Proxyfor Consent in PosthumousEgg Retrieval Cases, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1331 (2012).
68. Jane E. Allen, Woman Pregnant by Sperm from Corpse, AP NEWS (July 16, 1998),
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1998/Woman-Pregnant-By-Sperm-From-Corpse/id-af6fl754d1ea1
9d202e17a046220e373.
69. Id. Dr. Rothman also stated that he found performing posthumous sperm retrieval
procedures for grieving families "lessened their pain, lessened their grief and gave them something
to focus on other than the death of their loved one." Id.
70. Williams, supra note 20, at 199.
71. Id.
72. ld at 199-200.
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B. Legal Background.Internationaland Local JudicialOpinions and Legislative Responses
1. France: Full Ban on Posthumous Insemination
When Alain Parpalaix was diagnosed with testicular cancer, he
decided to deposit his sperm at the Centre d'Etude et de Conservation du
Sperme Humain ("CECOS") in order to preserve its reproductive
potential.73 When Alain began to make the deposits, he and his
girlfriend, Corinne, were living together.74 The couple was officially
married on December 23, 1983, but their marriage was short-livedAlain died two days after the marriage.75 After Alain's death, Corinne
requested that CECOS release her husband's sperm deposits to her so
that she could use them for PHR.76 CECOS refused to release the sperm
to her, arguing that there was no French law that could compel the
release.77 Corinne brought her case to the French Ministry of Health, but
when the Ministry postponed its ruling on the matter, she and Alain's
parents sued in court to gain control over the deposits.78
The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Creteil held that "the fact that
there was no prior written contract outlining the posthumous use of
sperm did not necessarily indicate that Alain never intended for Corinne
to use [it] .,,7 Furthermore, the Tribunal determined that Alain's parents
were the best people to ascertain the intent of their son, since he and his
wife had only been married for two days, and Alain's parents supported
the decision to have the sperm given to Corinne.8" Thus, without an
explicit lack of consent from Alain, the Tribunal was able to order
CECOS to turn over Alain's sperm to Corinne.8" In response to this
holding, CECOS adopted a policy that placed a ban on using deposited

73. Parpalaix c. Centre d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme (CECOS), T.G.I. Cr~teil, Aug.
1, 1984, Gaz. Du Pal. 1984, 2, pan. jurispr., 560.
74. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of
Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 229-30 (1986).
75. Id. at 230.

76. E.J. Dionne, Jr., A French Widow Sues Over Sperm, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1984, at A7,
court,
In
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/02/world/a-french-widow-sues-over-sperm.html.
CECOS' attorneys argued that "its only legal obligation is to return the sperm to the donor." Id
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Gail A. Katz, Note, Parpalaix c. CECOS: Protecting Intent in Reproductive
Technology, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 683, 686 (discussing holding of the Tribunal that a lack of an
explicit statement of Alain's intent did not preclude the release of his sperm to Corinne).
80. Id. at 687.
81. Id. The court also concluded that because Alain had "no way of knowing CECOS' policy
with regard to deceased donor sperm, the absence of his written consent is not evidence that he did
not consent to a posthumous child." Id.
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sperm for PHR, and this policy was upheld by the French courts. 8 2

Ultimately, France passed a law that banned posthumous insemination
throughout the country.8 3
2. England: Explicit Written Consent
In 1995, Stephen Blood fell into a coma as a result of contracting
meningitis and was near death in the intensive care unit of a hospital.84
While Stephen was alive, he read a magazine article where a widow
expressed her desire to have a child using her deceased husband's frozen
sperm.85 Though he communicated to his wife, Diane, that if anything
similar were to ever happen to him, that he hoped she would consider
having his child alone, he never left any written record of his intention.8 6
The lack of a written record did not complicate the retrieval of Stephen's
sperm-when Diane requested that her husband's sperm be retrieved,
her request was readily granted.87 However, the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority ("HFEA") of the United Kingdom denied Ms.
Blood the "opportunity to use [her husband's] sperm for fertilization" in
posthumous reproduction because he had not left written consent as
required by the HFEA.88
Diane fought for the right to take her husband's sperm abroad to
Belgium, where the law would permit her to use the sperm for PHR.8 9
The HFEA ruled that she could not be inseminated with her husband's
sperm in England, nor could she export his sperm to Belgium because by
doing so she would be "avoid[ing] the specific requirements of the
Fertilization and Embryology Act."" However, the Court of Appeals
found that she "had the right to export her husband's sperm [to Belgium]
82. G. Bahadur, Opinion: Death and Conception, 17 HuM. REPROD. 2769, 2771 (2002).
83. Id. In 2016, a French tribunal permitted a woman to transport her dead husband's sperm
from France to Spain to use in posthumous insemination. See James Brooks, FranceAllows Export
of Dead Man's Sperm, BioNEws (June 13, 2016), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page 658692.asp.
This ruling was made despite the existing French ban on the exportation of gametes to other
countries for the purpose of posthumous insemination. Id.
84. R v. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., exparte Blood (1997), 2 WLR 806, 806
(Eng.).
85. Emma Brockes, Blood Lines, GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/
science/2004/oct/1 8/medicineandhealth.lifeandhealth.
86. Id. Diane states that her reason for requesting the retrieval was to "preserve the possibility
of having children. She wanted to keep the option alive so that, some time in the future, when she
was in a calmer state of mind, she could make a decision." Id.
87. See id. ("The doctors had never heard of such a request. But, knowing of no good reason
why not to, they mechanically extracted some of Stephen's sperm and shortly afterwards he died.").
88. Clarke, supra note 67, at 1352.
89. Brockes, supranote 85.
90. Kathryn D. Katz, Parenthoodfrom the Grave: Protocols for Retrieving and Utilizing
Gametesfrom the Dead or Dying, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 297-98 (2006).
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under the European Community Treaty, which guarantees freedom of
91
movement for goods and medical services among member states." She
left for Belgium fourteen months later and became pregnant with their
93
son, Liam.9 2 After the decision in ex parte Blood was rendered, the
HFEA was amended to extend the written consent requirement to the
retrieval of sperm from patients who are comatose, and PSR remains
authorized only "with the valid, written consent of the deceased."94
3. Israel: Implied Consent
In 2002, Sergeant Keivan Cohen of the Israeli Defense Force was
killed in an attack on the Gaza Strip. 95 Keivan was only twenty years old
at the time of his death and his mother, Rachel, had the idea to preserve
her son's sperm only hours after learning he had been killed.96 That same
day, she contacted the local army office to request that her son's sperm
be extracted and that request was granted. 97 One year later, Rachel
decided to seek out women who would be interested in serving as a
surrogate for her son's child and placed an advertisement in the local
newspaper.98 She received multiple responses from women who were
willing to serve as the surrogate, but the hospital refused to release the
sperm to her because she was Keivan's mother.99
In 2003, the Israel Attorney General published a set of guidelines
that permitted requests for retrieval and insemination only to be honored
when a partner of the deceased makes the request.10 ' The guidelines then
recommended that a court determines on a case-by-case basis if the
deceased had ever demonstrated an intent to become a parent during his
lifetime.10 1 If this determination was made, the court would hold that

91. Id. at 298.
92. See Brockes, supra note 85.
93. See R v. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., ex parte Blood (1997), 2 WLR 806,
820-23 (Eng.).
94. See Jon B. Evans, Comment, Post-Mortem Semen Retrieval:A NormativePrescriptionfor
Legislation in the UnitedStates, 1 CONCORDIA L. REv. 133, 140 (2016).
95. Joel Greenberg, In Life a Soldier, in Death a Father?, Ci. TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2007),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-01-29/news/0701290159_1_insemination-procedure-spermisraeli-soldier.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Ms. Cohen requested that the woman be "willing to be inseminated with her son's
sperm and to 'take the responsibility of being a mother."' Id.
99. Id. Ms. Cohen received 200 responses to her newspaper advertisement, and she then
narrowed her choices down to forty candidates. Id
100. Vardit Ravitsky, Posthumous Reproduction Guidelines in Israel, 34 HEALTH CTR. REP. 6,
6-7 (2004).
101. Id.at 6.
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there was a "presumed consent" to PHR. 10 2 In 2005, an Israeli family
rights group filed suit on behalf of the Cohen family, arguing for
Rachel's right to carry out her son's express "will" to have children. 03
Keivan's mother expressed that "[h]e would always talk about how he
wanted to get married and have children.... He loved children and was
especially connected to little ones." 1" At trial, evidence that Keivan
wanted to have children, which consisted of testimony and video
footage, was presented to the court. 105 On January 15, 2007, the court
ruled in favor of the Cohen family, but noted that the holding only
applied to that specific case and that it should not be considered
precedential in Israel.' °6
4. United States: Sperm as an Anatomical Gift?
On September 9, 2007, Daniel Christy suffered severe brain trauma
after a motorcycle accident.101 His fianc6e, Amy Kruse, realized that he
would not recover from the brain damage and "began to consider the
possibility of having Daniel's sperm retrieved and saved.""1 8 Daniel and
Amy had planned to have children together someday, and after Amy
discussed the possibility of PHR with Daniel's parents, a sperm retrieval
request was made.10 9 Daniel's physicians consulted with the hospital's
ethics committee, and when the committee could not come to a
conclusion, the hospital refused to retrieve Daniel's sperm absent a court
order. 1 0 This prompted his parents to file an emergency order
102.

Id.

103.
104.
105.

Greenberg, supra note 95.
Id.
Aron Heller, Family Gets OK to

Use Dead Man's Sperm, WASH. POST (Jan.

29, 2007, 6:33 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/29/AR20070
12900427.html. The evidence included a brief that stated Keivan was "afraid of dying [in Gaza]
before fathering offspring." Greenberg, supra note 95.
106. Greenberg, supra note 95. An Israeli court has also approved the retrieval of a deceased
woman's eggs for use in posthumous reproduction. See Mikaela Conley, Israeli Court Allows
Family to
Harvest Dead Daughter's Eggs,
ABC
NEWS
(Aug.
11,
2011),

http://abcnews.go.com/Health/israeli-family-permission-freeze-dead-daughters-eggs/story?
=

id 14272156. The eggs were that of a seventeen-year-old girl who had died in an accident, and the

family of the victim planned to donate the eggs to the victim's aunt, who suffered from infertility.
See Israeli Court Approves Harvesting of Dead Woman's Eggs, JEWISH J. (Aug. 8, 2011),

http://www.jewishjoumal.com/israel/article/israelicourt approves-harvestingof deadwomans_
eggs_20110808.
107.

Bethany Spielman, Post Mortem Gamete Retrieval After Christy, 5 ABA HEALTH

ESOURCE

2

(2008),

https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/abahealth-esource_

home/Volume5 02_spielman.html (citing In re Christy, Case No. EQV068545 (Johnson Cty. Iowa

Sept. 13,
108.
109.
110.

2007)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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compelling the procedure to be conducted in the Sixth District Court
of Iowa. 111
Judge Martha Beckelman needed to determine whether or not
current Iowa state law would permit the extraction of Christy's sperm
without his explicit consent. 112 The State of Iowa has adopted the most
recent version of the UAGA, the 2006 UAGA, as the law governing
anatomical gifts in the state.113 The 2006 UAGA, unlike previous
versions of the UAGA, defines "tissue" in a manner that does not
explicitly exclude sperm from the definition." 4 Sheldon Kurtz, a law
professor from the University of Iowa and a principal drafter of the 2006
UAGA, submitted an affidavit to the court supporting an interpretation
that sperm is encompassed within the definition of "tissue."'11 Referring
to the allowance of PSR, he wrote that it "is my opinion that this is a
circumstance that was contemplated by the (law's commissioners) in
adopting the new Uniform Anatomical Gift Act" and that the
"[h]arvesting [of] Mr. Christy's semen with the intention to' 16direct
donation to his fianc6e is legally permissible under the Iowa act."'
In consideration of the affidavit, Judge Beckelman ruled in favor of
Daniel Christy's parents, stating that "[u]nder the act, an anatomical gift,
including the gift of sperm, can be made by the donor, or, if the donor
did not refuse to make the gift by the donor's parents following the
donor's death."1' 17 Since Daniel was listed as an organ donor, Judge
Beckelman decided that his sperm could be designated as an anatomical
gift to Amy Kruse, and as such, his sperm could be retrieved." 8 In
holding this, she relied on additional statutory provisions within the
2006 UAGA, including UAGA Section 4, UAGA Section 7, and UAGA
Section 9.119 After the ruling, Daniel's parents and fiancde signed a
consent form, agreeing to only use the sperm for in vitro fertilization and

111. See id.
112. Bethany Spielman, Pushing the Dead Into the Next Reproductive Frontier:Post Mortem
Gamete Retrieval Under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 331, 332 (2009)
(discussing basis for Judge Beckelman's ruling in In re Christy).
113. Seeid.at333.
114. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(30) (UNWF.LAW COMM'N 2006).
115. See Samantha Miller, Judge: Family May Take Dying Son's Sperm, DAILY IOWAN, Sept.
14, 2007, at 1A.
116. See K Fiegen, Judge: Family Can Give Son's Semen to Fiancde, IOWA CITY PRESSCITIZEN, Sept. 14, 2007, at 4A.

117. Id.
118. Spielman, supra note 107.
119. Spielman, supra note 112, at 333 ("Her ruling clearly relies on UAGA 2006's § 2(30);
§ 4; § 7; and § 9, which establish an individual's authority to make a gift; the authority to refuse to
make a gift; the authority of others to make a gift when the deceased had not done so before death;
and the inclusion of sperm as something that may be donated.").
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120
agreeing to not have the procedure done at the University of Iowa.
and once
The sperm was extracted from Daniel on September 14, 2007,
12 1

the removal was complete, his life support was turned off.

Though Judge Beckelman's ruling in In re Christy is binding in the
Sixth District Court of Iowa, the holding is not binding in other courts
across the United States. 122 Likewise, the rulings of international courts
are not precedential in the United States, but merely serve as potential
models for PSR and PHR legislation. 123 The sole attempt made in the
United States to enact legislation pertaining to these procedures was
made by New York State Senator Roy Goodman in 1998.124 A bill was

proposed to amend New York State Public Health Law to ban PSR
unless the decedent gave explicit written consent prior to his death and
to require that the request only be granted if the spouse or partner of the
deceased requested the procedure.1 25 The bill was only introduced to the
Senate and Assembly's respective Health Committees and was never
remains
submitted to a vote in the legislature.126 Thus, the United States
127
without concrete legislation regulating either PSR or PHR.

120. Spielman, supra note 107.
121. Id.
122. See id. (noting that though the holding of In re Christy is not binding, the holding can
have persuasive authority in other courts, as "judicial interpretations of uniform acts are considered
persuasive authority in jurisdictions that have adopted the acts").
123. See Katz, supra note 90, at 297-311 (discussing the development of various protocols and
approaches for posthumous gamete retrieval and posthumous reproduction created throughout the

world).
124.

Philip Cohen, Life After Death - New York State Moves To Keep Dead Men's Sperm in
2

the Family, NEW SCl. (Mar. 21, 1998), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg157 1263.600-lifeafler-death--new-york-state-moves-to-keep-dead-mens-sperm-in-the-family. When Dr. Rothman,
the urologist who pioneered both PSR and PHR procedures, was asked about this law, he described
it as "cruel and unusual punishment" and argued that if any law were to be created to govern PSR or
PHR, it should govern the "use of sperm, [and] not its retrieval." Id. Dr. Rothman also believed that
Roy Goodman's law "[wasn't] anything to be proud of.... Id.
125. See A.B. 8043, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); S.B. 1121, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1999).
126. A.B. 8043, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); S.B. 1121, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
1999); see also Cohen, supra note 124 (noting that at the time the bill was introduced to the N.Y.
State Senate, Goodman hoped that it would "become law within a year"). Though the Senator had
hopes for a start at passing PSR legislation within a short amount of time, twenty years after this
effort, there is still no existing legislation pertaining to PSR or PHR. See Bahm, Karkazis &
Magnus, supra note 24, at 840.
127. Bahm, Karkazis & Magnus, supra note 24, at 840.
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III. LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNREGULATED PSR AND
PHR IN THE UNITED STATES

PSR and PHR present many issues that are both legal and ethical at
their core."' Part III of this Note examines select issues complicated by
the lack of United States PSR and PHR legislation. 29 Subpart III.A
sheds light on constitutional considerations that must be taken into
130
account when creating or restricting opportunities to PSR or PHR.
Subpart III.B discusses the current source of rules for PSR and PHR,
which exists almost exclusively within hospital guidelines and
protocols."' Subpart II.B also describes the Cornell Guidelines and
Stanford Protocols to illuminate how these guidelines can differ, and
consequently, provide unequal opportunities of access to both
procedures.1 32 Subpart III.C discusses in depth the holding in In re
Christy and examines arguments that the UAGA as currently written
cannot serve as a legal basis for allowing implied consent to PSR or
PHR procedures.1 33 Finally, Subpart III.D discusses ethical conundrums
that can arise when one engages in PSR and PHR without the explicit
consent of the decedent.134 It will also analyze laws in the United States
that give deference to the wishes of the decedent and argue that the same
must be done in the construction of laws pertaining to PSR and PHR.13 5
A. The Right to Procreateand a Right to Posthumous Reproduction
in the United States
The full ban on PHR in France is not an isolated one-there are
laws that place similar bans on both procedures in Germany, Sweden,
and Taiwan.136 Prior to enacting restrictive legislation in the United
States, it must be considered whether or not PSR and PHR procedures
are entitled to constitutional protection.137 Though the United States
Supreme Court has never specifically held that individuals have a

128. See infra Part nlI.
129. See infra Part Ill.
130. See infra Part M.A.
131. See infra Part I.B.
132. See infra Part III.B.
133. See infra Part III.C.
134. See infra Part I.D.
135. See infra Part III.D.
136. Yael Hashiloni-Dolev & Silke Schicktanz, A Cross-CulturalAnalysis of Posthumous
Reproduction: The Significance of the Gender and Margins-of-Life Perspectives, 4 REPROD.
BIOMEDICAL & SOC'Y. ONLINE 21, 25 (2017). Other nations that are regarded as having restrictive
policies include Italy, France, Hungary, Slovenia, Norway, and Malaysia. Id
137. See infra notes 138-61 and accompanying text.
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decisions in a number of cases
fundamental right to PHR, it has rendered
13 8
inference.
this
that provide support to
First, the Court has implied the existence of a right to procreate
under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 39 The Fourteenth Amendment states
that "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."' 4 ° In Meyer v. Nebraska, Judge
McReynolds discusses what the concept of "liberty" under the
Fourteenth Amendment entails.' 4 ' The judge states that "[w]ithout
doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual... to marry, to establish a home and
bring up children... and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."1 42 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court invalidated Oklahoma's
Criminal Sterilization Act because it "deprive[d] certain individuals of a
right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right to have
offspring"-and violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 43 The Supreme
Court also determined in Skinner that the right to procreate is one that is
a "fundamental" right. 1" The Supreme Court has also deliberately
expanded reproductive rights throughout the twentieth century to
include, among other rights, the rights of married and unmarried persons
45
to use contraceptives and the right of a woman to obtain an abortion.'
Though the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on whether or
not the use of assistive reproductive technology is constitutionally
protected, arguments have been made that the language of Skinner is
broad enough to extend protection to the use of assistive reproductive
technology. 146 Moreover, federal court judges have declared that the
138. See Clarke, supra note 67, at 1343 n.69 (arguing that the Supreme Court has recognized a
"right to procreate" since 1923).
139. Seeid. at 1343.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
142. Id.
143. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
144. Id. at 541. Fundamental rights are those that are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937). Furthermore, fundamental rights can
only be infringed upon if a "compelling" governmental interest that is "narrowly tailored" to
advance a state's legislative objectives exists. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
145. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-67 (holding that a woman has the right to obtain an abortion
before the fetus is viable without interference of state interests); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
443 (1972) (holding that a married person's right to use contraceptives extends to unmarried
persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (holding that an individual's right to
privacy extends to married couples' right to use contraceptives). However, abortion rights have also
been limited after Roe. Cf Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156 (2007) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Partial Birth Abortion Act).
146. See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families,and ProcreativeLiberty: The Legal Structure
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fundamental right to procreate does extend to the use of reproductive
technology to bring about pregnancy. 147 In Lifchez v. Hartigan, Judge
Williams declared that "[i]t takes no great leap of logic to see that within
the cluster of constitutionally protected choices that includes the right to
have access to contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster
the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather
than prevent, pregnancy."14' 8 It has further been argued that to not extend
this fundamental right to procreate to those who are utilizing non-coital
reproductive technologies, and only to those engaging in coital sex,
could be in violation of the equal protection guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. 149 In Cameron v. Board of Education, Judge Spiegel
held that "the Supreme Court's precedent [in regard to privacy rights] is
clear. A woman has a constitutional privacy right to control her
reproductive functions. Consequently, a woman possesses the right to
become pregnant by artificial insemination." '15 0
Lower courts throughout the United States have also addressed the
question as to whether or not there is a right to PHR. 51 The holdings in
each of these cases determine that there is a right to use posthumously
retrieved sperm for procreation and that there must be sufficient proof
that the deceased would have consented to this use of his sperm. 152 In the
case of Hecht v. Superior Court, the court had to decide if the decedent's
girlfriend, Deborah Hecht, whom the decedent explicitly stated his
intention to have children with, or his children, who wanted to destroy
their deceased father's sperm vials, should gain possession over the
vials. 153 The court ultimately ruled to vacate the order seeking the

of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 958-60 (1986) ("If the Supreme Court would
recognize a married couple's right to coital reproduction, it should recognize a couple's right to
reproduce noncoitally as well. The couple's interest in reproducing is the same, no matter how
conception occurs, for the values and interests underlying coital reproduction are equally present.").
147. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
148. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. 111.1990).
149. See Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process:
Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J. L. MED. 455, 464 n.89
(1999) ("A failure to extend procreative liberties and rights to those employing noncoital
reproductive methodologies might be construed as a denial of equal protection under the
Constitution.").
150. Cameron v. Bd. of Educ., 795 F. Supp. 228,237 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
151. See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
152. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (setting aside
a trial court order that Kane's sperm should be destroyed and not distributed to his girlfriend for use
in posthumous reproduction); see also Hall v. Fertility Inst. of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348, 1349,
1352 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that it was appropriate for the Court to prevent the release of the
sperm to decedent's girlfriend without first determining his intent for the sperm).
153. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.
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destruction of sperm. 5 4 The court asserted that "assuming that both
Hecht and decedent desired to conceive a child using the decedent's
sperm, [his children] fail to establish a state interest sufficient enough to
justify interference with that decision." '
Similarly, in Hall v. Fertility Institute, the Court of Appeal of
Louisiana deliberated whether or not the sperm of the decedent, Barry
Hall, should be released to his mother, Mary Alice Hall, or to his
girlfriend, Christina St. John, in the face of conflicting accounts of
Barry's intent for his sperm.' 56 Though St. John argued that Barry's
sperm had been gifted to her for use in posthumous conception,
affidavits submitted by Barry's family members stated their belief that
Barry would have only wanted to have children with her while he was
alive. 57 The trial court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the
release of the sperm from the Fertility Institute in order to conduct a trial
to determine Barry's intent for his sperm.' 58 The Court of Appeal
affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that ordering the sperm to be
turned over to St. John, without first investigating Barry's intent for his
sperm, could have consequences beyond repair.' 59 It opined that the
"possible development of human beings is such a serious consequence
that the irreparable nature of the risk at issue is clear ... [and] the
emotional damage to the decedent's mother and Executrix
should.., children [be] sired against the wishes of her dead son is
obvious .... "160 Thus, without a demonstration of the decedent's intent,
not be transferred to St.
the Court of Appeal held that the sperm should
161
John for use in posthumous reproduction.
B. HospitalGuidelines and ProtocolsLead to
Lack of Unifonnity Across the United States
Hospitals have been forced to develop their own protocols and
guidelines for PSR and PHR procedures without any legislative
instruction. 62 Though many institutions have created these protocols,
many have not yet developed and implemented protocols overseeing

154.
155.

Id. at291.
Id. at289.

156.
157.
158.

Hall, 647 So. 2d at 1349.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1349.

159.
160.
161.

Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id.

162.

Evans, supra note 94, at 144.
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either.'6 3 For instance, representatives from Woodhull Medical Center,
where Wenjian Liu's sperm was extracted, declined to comment on
whether or not Woodhull had a policy governing PSR or PHR
requests. 164 The New York Hospital Guidelines for Consideration of
Request for Post-Mortem Sperm Retrieval 165 ("Cornell Guidelines" or
"Guidelines") and the Stanford Protocols 166 ("Protocol" or "Protocols")
are the two most recognized sources of PSR and PHR guidance for
hospitals, and both have been adopted by numerous medical institutions
across the nation. 167 However, it is clear from an examination of each
that there are vast differences between them. 1 68 This creates a lack of
uniformity in procedures that can lead to disparities in access to PSR
69
and PHR.'
The Cornell Guidelines were developed in 1995 at New York
Hospital. 17' A five-person panel of experts created these guidelines
based upon four general considerations: "(1) issues of consent (2)
medical contraindications (3) resource availability and (4) a one-year
' 171
specimen waiting period for bereavement and recipient evaluation.
First, the Guidelines state that "[s]perm retrieval after brain death can be
ethical, provided that there is explicit prior or reasonably inferred
consent."' 7 2 The Guidelines assert that the decedent's "actions and
discussions prior to death with respect to intended pregnancy" should be
assessed in order to determine whether or not it could be "reasonably
inferred" that he would want to undergo PSR, and only men "undergoing
fertility treatment, actively attempting conception, or who had
specifically expressed their plans to attempt conception in the immediate
future would be suitable candidates for retrieval.' 7 3
163. See Bahm, Karkazis & Magnus, supra note 24, at 840 ("Many institutions do not yet have
protocols in place, and those that are in place differ in important ways, including the standard of
evidence regarding consent, wait time mandates before the use of the sperm, method of sperm
retrieval, and logistics of sperm storage and payment for the procedure.").
164. See Klein & Licea, supranote 48.
165. New York Hospital Guidelinesfor Consideration of Requests for Post-Mortem Sperm
Retrieval, WEILL CORNELL MED. COLL. JAMES BUCHANAN BRADY FOUND. DEP'T UROLOGY,

https://web.archive.org/web/20070927163735/http://www.cornellurology.com/uro/comell/guideline
s.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
166. See Bahm, Karkazis & Magnus, supra note 24, at 839.
167. Evans, supra note 94, at 144 ("Two of the best known guidelines are the Stanford
Protocols and the New York Hospital Guidelines.").
168. See infra notes 170-85 and accompanying text.
169. See Bahm, Karkazis & Magnus, supra note 24, at 840.
170. New York Hospital Guidelines for Consideration of Requests for Post-Mortem Sperm
Retrieval, supra note 165.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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Second, the Cornell Guidelines recommend that only the decedent's
wife should be able to provide consent for the retrieval of sperm and use
the sperm in PHR.174 The Guidelines also recommend that if PSR takes
place, the man's death must have been sudden, and the procedure should
be conducted within twenty-four hours of the decedent's death.175 Third,
the Guidelines state that there must be local sperm banks that are
17 6
available to accept, process, and preserve the retrieved specimen.
Finally, the wife of the decedent must consent to a waiting period of one
year before she can attempt to get pregnant using the retrieved sperm,
and she "must [also] undergo medical and psychological consultations
with discussion of the procedures necessary to achieve conception,
'
including costs and medical interventions." 177
The Stanford Protocols were developed from an empirical analysis
conducted on existing PSR and PHR procedures in place throughout the
United States. 78 Bahm, Karkazis, and Magnus described two different
approaches that could be adopted when devising standards governing
these procedures.179 The first Protocol mandates that a request for PSR
not be granted unless those who request the procedure can prove that the
deceased consented to it before his death.18 ° In order for this to be
proven, the deceased must have issued a notarized written directive that
not only indicates the authorization of PSR but also specifically who is
permitted to receive the sperm. 81 This Protocol also requires that the
person receiving the sperm locate a facility willing to store it and pay for
its cryopreservation. 182 The second Protocol, to contrast, does not require
that the decedent has given explicit written consent. 183 Instead, his wife
or partner is authorized to decide whether or not the sperm should be
retrieved from the corpse. 84 Additionally, the second Protocol requires
that the sperm is not used for PHR earlier than a year after the date of

174. Id.
175. Id. In addition, his death could not have been caused by any disease that is known to
affect "spermatogenesis or effect transmission of disease." Id.
176.

Id.

177. Id.
178. See generally Bahm, Karkazis & Magnus, supra note 24 (conducting a study amongst
medical institutions to evaluate the best policies in developing protocol for posthumous sperm
retrieval).
179. Id. The two protocols are labeled the "limited role" protocol and the "family centered"
protocol. Id. at 841.
180. See id.
at 842 figi.
181. Id.
182. Id.The Protocol states that the requestor can take responsibility for the retrieved sperm by
signing a consent form. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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retrieval and mandates that the requestor undergoes psychological
counseling prior to using the sperm for PHR. 85
C. Legal Tradition of Respect
for the Wishes of the Incapacitatedand the Dead
In Arising from the Dead. Challenges of Posthumous Procreation,
Ann Reichman Schiff explains that "in posthumous reproduction the
family may have a strong procreative interest which may or may not
coincide with the interest of the deceased."' 86 The dilemma that Schiff
describes is illustrated in the following narratives.' 8 7 On April 5, 2009,
Nikolas Evans died in a fight outside of a bar at the age of twenty-one
years old.188 After Nikolas's death, his mother, Missy, agreed to have
five of his organs donated.' 89 In addition to organ donation, she decided
that she would have his sperm extracted so that it could be used to
conceive a grandchild. 9 ° When discussing the five anatomical gifts that
Missy gave from her son's body, she described the extraction of her
son's sperm as a gift to herself, stating, "Why can't I have a gift? Why
do I lose everything?"19' 1 She also asserted that her son "would want
[her] to do whatever [she] needed to do and [she] wanted something to
' 19 2
live on."
To compare, one wealthy British couple "bypassed British law" and
"created a 'designer grandson' after harvesting the sperm from their
dead son."'' The sperm was retrieved two days after his death and
immediately frozen.' 9 4 One year later, the sperm was transported to the
United States where Dr. David Smotrich then utilized donor eggs and a
surrogate in order to conceive their grandchild.19 5 The fertility specialist
"understood their son had not given formal consent to the extraction and
185. Id.
186. Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead. Challenges of Posthumous Procreation,
75 N.C. L. REv. 901, 953 (1997).
187. See infra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
188. Susan Donaldson James, Sperm Retrieval: Mother CreatesLife After Death, ABC NEWS
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Wellness/mother-murdered-son-hopes-creategrandchild-post-mortem/story?id-9913939.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Gemma Mullin, 'Desperatefor Heir': Wealthy Brit Couple Created 'DesignerGrandson'
After HarvestingSperm from Dead Son Who Was Killed in Motorbike Crash, SUN (Sept. 9, 2018,

5:27 AM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/7212088/british-couple-designer-grandson-sperm-deadson.

194. Id.
195. Id.
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' Despite
use of his sperm in the event of his death."196
this lack of formal
consent, the couple was desperate to "find someone who would be able
to create an heir" for their family and, through gender-selection, create
a grandson. 197
It is evident that both sets of parents' own desires motivated them
to preserve their sons' sperm, and it is plausible that their sole
motivation was not to fulfill their sons' reproductive wishes, but to
actualize their own desire to have a grandchild.198 However, United
States legal tradition places value on individual freedom and autonomy,
even when the individual can no longer speak for themselves or be
aware of the decisions that are made on their behalf.19 9 This translates to
certain legal rights and protections being afforded to the incapacitated
and the deceased through state and federal laws and should translate to
laws that value and prioritize the reproductive intentions of the decedent
and not the intentions of those who survive him.2 °°
At the federal level, the passage of the Patient Self-Determination
Act of 1990 ("PSDA") demonstrates Congress's intent to protect the
ability to control one's course of medical treatment. 20 1 The PSDA
requires that hospitals, nursing homes, home health care agencies, and
health maintenance organizations provide patients with information
about health care planning, health care decision-making, and advance
health care directives ("advance directives").20 2 The PSDA mandates
that health care providers administer to the patient information about
their state's health care decision-making rights and requires that the
health care provider inquire as to whether or not the patient has an
196. Id. "Legal experts claim this means the couple may have committed a criminal act and
could face prosecution." Id. A former chairman of the British Fertility Society, Professor Allan
Pacey, stated that "[i]f the son in this case wasn't being treated by a clinic, and has not signed the
necessary consent forms for the posthumous retrieval, storage and use of his sperm, then a criminal
act has probably taken place." Id.
197. Id. The couple selected the gender of their grandson to be male, and in the United
Kingdom, gender selection is not legal. Id.
198. See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
199. See Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives: A History
and Assessment of the Patient-SelfDeterminationAct, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 249, 249 (1997)
("Our legal tradition values individual freedom and autonomy. Over the past generation, this
tradition has applied with increasing force in the context of medical care.").
200. See generally Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763
(2009) (discussing the different legal rights afforded to decedents in the United States).
201. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 § 4206, § 4751,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115-117, 1388-204 (codified at 42 U.S.C. (1990)); see also Larson & Eaton,
supra note 199, at 250 ("Society's preference for advance directives is reflected in the Patient SelfDetermination Act.").
202. Health Care Advance Directives: What is the Patient Self-DeterminationAct?, AM. BAR
Ass'N (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public-education/resources/law_
issues for consumers/patient self determinationact.html.
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existing advance directive. °3 It also prohibits the health care provider
from requiring the patient to have or create an advance directive
and prevents discrimination against those patients who do not wish to
have one.20 4
The passing of the PSDA was largely stimulated by the ethical
dilemmas presented in the Supreme Court decision of Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health."5 In Cruzan, Nancy Cruzan
fell into a persistent vegetative state ("PVS") after a severe car accident
in 1983 .2° 6 Her parents desired to remove the feeding tube that was
keeping her alive, but the hospital refused to remove it without a court
order.20 7 The Supreme Court of Missouri held that "because there was no
clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's desire to have life-sustaining
treatment withdrawn under such circumstances, her parents lacked
authority to effectuate such a request.- 2 8 When the case was appealed to
the Supreme Court, the Court had to decide whether or not it was
constitutional for the State of Missouri to require "that evidence of an
incompetent's wishes as to withdrawal of treatment be proved by clear
and convincing evidence., 20 9 Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined
that the evidentiary standard was constitutional and determined that the
Cruzan family was required to present "clear and convincing evidence"
that Nancy would want her feeding tube removed in order to discontinue
her life support. 210 Her parents continued to advocate for her wishes to
be honored, and the tube eventually was removed, but not until eight
years after Nancy initially fell into the PVS.211
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 passim (1990); Larson & Eaton, supra
note 199, at 255.
206. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266 ("Nancy Cruzan lost control of her car as she traveled down
Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. The vehicle overturned, and Cruzan was discovered lying
face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac function.").
207. Id at 267-68.
208. Id. at 265.
209. Id. at 280.
210. Seeid. at 280-84.
211. Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y.
TMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/27/us/nancy-cruzan-dies-outlivedby-a-debate-over-the-right-to-die.html. In the Missouri court that denied the Cruzans' request for
removal of a feeding tube, it had discounted a claim from Nancy's former roommate that she would
not want to be kept on life support, finding that the statements were "unreliable for the purposes of
determining her intent." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268. However, when the case was remanded back to
the Missouri court, the judge heard new testimony from three more friends of Nancy regarding her
wishes, and the judge deemed this to be "clear and convincing evidence." Nancy Cruzan's
Accomplishment, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1990, at A18, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/27/
opinion/nancy-cruzan-s-accomplishment.html. On August 17, 1996, thirteen years after Nancy's
accident and six years after the feeding tube was removed, Nancy's father committed suicide. Marc
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Nancy's PVS rendered "[t]he areas of her brain that once thought,
felt, and experienced sensations" badly degenerated, and the damage
was "irreversible, permanent, progressive and ongoing.- 212 She would
never "meaningfully interact with her environment again," and she
would remain "oblivious to her surroundings" until her death. 213 Yet, the
Supreme Court and the State of Missouri prioritized what Nancy would
have wanted, even though her deteriorated condition made it impossible
for her to ever become aware of the decision made.214 In ruling that a
state may require "clear and convincing evidence" in order to remove
the feeding tube, the Supreme Court upheld the state court's decision
that Cruzan's feeding tube could not be removed absent "clear and
convincing" evidence of her wishes and enabled a protection of
incompetent patient's wishes. 215 Though a "deceased person is a bright
line past being an incompetent patient, it seems states also would be
enabled to require such 'a high standard of evidence' before allowing
posthumous conception to occur. '216 Indeed, Schiff evokes the "clear and
convincing" evidentiary standard in her arguments against PHR without
consent of decedent.217 She states that "[i]n light of the potential that
exists for a conflict of interests on the part of the family, a "clear and
convincing" standard of evidence of the deceased's prior wishessatisfied either by a written or oral statement-is preferable to a
substituted judgment standard."2'18
In addition, states have created legislation intended to honor the
medical treatment wishes of deceased and incapacitated persons. 21 9 For

example, the Family Health Care Decisions Act of New York State
("FHCDA") permits relatives and close friends to serve as medical
decision-making surrogates for those patients who are incapacitated and
unable to make these decisions for themselves.22 Though the surrogate
Peyser,
A
Father's
Sorrow,
NEWSWEEK
(Sept.
1,
1996,
8:00
PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/fathers-sorrow-177730. Though right to life protestors contended that
his suicide was due to guilt over removing Nancy from life support, the Cruzan family insists that
her father never regretted his decision. Id.
212. Cruzan,497 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
214. See id. at 280-84 (majority opinion).
215. Seeid. at 284-85.
216. Michele L. Brenwald & Kay Redeker, A Primer on Posthumous Conception and Related
Issues ofAssisted Reproduction, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 599,611 n.49 (1999).
217. Schiff, supra note 186, at 953.
218. Id. One state's understanding of its "clear and convincing evidence" standard may be
more or less flexible than that of another state. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151,
157, 175 (Cal. 2001) (holding that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard was not met despite
the decedent mentioning to his brother that he would not want to live in a vegetative state).
219. See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
220. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH L. § 2994-d (McKinney 2017).
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is given the power to make these decisions, their standard of decisionmaking must be in accordance with what the incapacitated patient would
want, and not what the surrogate wants to occur. 221 First and foremost,
the surrogate "shall make health decisions in accordance with the
222
patient's wishes, including the patient's religious and moral beliefs.,
If that patient's wishes are not "reasonably known and cannot with
reasonable diligence be ascertained," the decisions must be made in
accordance with the patient's best interest and the decisions that are
223 All fifty
rendered must be "consistent with the values of the patient.,
states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that address
224
medical decision-making for patients that are incapacitated.
Furthermore, each of the state statutes demand that surrogates employ
decision-making standards that are in accordance with the interests and
values of the incapacitated patient.225
D. In re Christy and the 2006 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act as Basisfor
PermittingImplied Consentfor PSR andPHR Procedures
The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") creates model legislation that lawmakers can adopt in the
crafting of their own legislation. 226 The goal of the UAGA is to promote
uniformity amongst the states in regard to laws controlling organ, eye,
and tissue donation.227 Indeed, the UAGA has been successful in its goal
of uniformity-by 1971, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had
adopted the original UAGA with few modifications, and as of 2012,
forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
have adopted the 2006 UAGA. 228 Though a majority all of the states
have adopted the 2006 version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
there are three versions of the UAGA that still remain in place in some
221.
222.
223.

Id. § 2994-d(4).
Id. § 2994-d(4)(a)(i).
Id. § 2994-d(4)(a)-(b).

224.

Health CareDecision-MakingAuthority: What is the Decision-MakingStandard?, AMER.

BAR ASS'N (July 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law aging/
What is the Decision MadngStandard.authcheckdam.pdf.
225. See id. (presenting a chart in which all standards for laws for health care agents and court
appointed guardians for each of the fifty states are outlined).
226.

See About the ULC, UNIF. L. COMMISSION: THE NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON

UNIF. ST. LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%/20the%
visited Feb. 3, 2019).

2

0ULC (last

227. Anatomical Gift Act (2006) Summary, UNIF. L. COMMISSION: THE NAT'L CONF. OF
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?
LAWS,
ST.
UNIF.
ON
COMMISSIONERS

title=Anatomical%20Gift%/o2OAct%o2O (2006) (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
228. Britta Martinez, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1968), THE EMBRYO PROJECT
968
.
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 5, 2013), https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/uniform-anatomical-gift-act-1
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states: the 1968 UAGA, the 1987 UAGA, and the 2006 UAGA.22 9
Furthermore, legislators can add specific provisions to the Act in
accordance with the needs of their state. 230 The NCCUSL recommends
that all states adopt the 2006 UAGA for numerous reasons. 2 13 Revisions
made to the 2006 UAGA strengthen "first person consent," which is an
individual's decision to donate their organs, eyes, or tissues after death,
and it is more difficult under the 2006 UAGA for others to amend or
revoke their anatomical gift. 232 Additionally, gifts that are made through
donor registries and through state-issued identification cards are
specifically authorized under the Act, and the 2006 UAGA is meant to
harmonize with "federal law, current technology and practice, and
Advance Medical Directives. 2 33
In her article, "Pushing the Dead Into the Next Reproductive
Frontier: Post Mortem Gamete Retrieval Under the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act," Bethany Spielman scrutinizes the ruling of In re Christy and
the use of the 2006 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act as a means for
permitting PSR and PHR. 234 The rule of Judge Beckelman was unique,
according to Spielman, because (1) she interpreted a uniform act, and (2)
"[the ruling] did not explicitly attend to the reproductive potential of
gametes, either by stating that conception fell under the purposes of
UAGA, or by stating that the purposes of UAGA were not of central
importance and could be overlooked. ' ,23 Spielman also indicates that
Judge Beckelman was not the first to consider whether or not the UAGA
could be construed to permit posthumous gamete retrieval. 36 Schiff
found that the 1987 UAGA could not be construed to permit posthumous
gamete retrieval because PHR is not a stated purpose of the Act-"the
stated purposes for donation and for 'transplantation, therapy, medical or
dental education, research, or advancement of medical or dental
research.' 23 Susan Kerr observed this as well, noting that the UAGA's

229. Anatomical Gifi Act (2006) Summary, supra note 227.
230. About the ULC, supra note 226.
231. Why States Should Adopt UAGA, UNIF. L. COMMISSION: THE NAT. CONF. OF
COMMSSIONERS ON UNLF. ST. LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20
States%20Should%20Adopt%20UAGA (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Spielman, supra note 112, at 331, 334 (arguing that Judge Beckelman's ruling in In re
Christy could have serious implications for posthumous gamete retrieval and posthumous
reproduction throughout the United States and that her interpretation of the Uniform Anatomical
Gift interpretation is flawed).
235. Id. at 333-34.
236. Id. at 332.
237. Schiff, supra note 186, at 928.
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stated purpose does not include conception.2 38 Spielman also rehashes
criticisms made by Brock and Mastroianni, who acknowledge the
possibility that gametes could be "legally distinguishable" from organs
due to their life-creating capabilities.23 9 Furthermore, Brock and
Mastroianni argue that decisions involving the donation of gametes
imply the "right to procreate and corresponding right not to procreate
and personal decisions
[which] are well established as fundamental
2 41
protection.
constitutional
deserving
Though the UAGA is a model act and not official law, in order for
the Act to have its "objective of uniformity," there must be "consistent
judicial interpretation[s]" of it.2 41 Therefore, the NCCUSL includes a

"uniformity of interpretation" provision in the UAGA that tasks state
judges to interpret the UAGA consistently and requires the rulings of
state courts on the UAGA to be treated as persuasive authorities in other
state courts.242 Due to this, Spielman anticipates that courts will view the
In re Christy ruling as persuasive authority when considering cases of
PSR and PHR.243 Spielman also notes that the In re Christy case
presented the "best-case scenario for when such requests should be
granted" since Daniel was listed as an organ donor, his family desired
the procedure to take place, and the facility storing Daniel's sperm was
willing to store it. 24 It is important for legislators, judges, and medical

professionals alike to contemplate Spielman's critiques of the In re
Christy decision when determining whether or not the PSR and PHR
should be permitted in more ethically challenging cases.245
IV. LEGAL SOLUTIONS: PRIORITIZING THE CONSENT OF THE DECEASED

Anne Reichman Schiff argues that allowing a person to "control the
fate of his or her gametes is arguably even more significant than
allowing a person to control the fate of his or her cadaveric organs,
because procreation is essential to an individual's identity in a way that
organ donation is not. 2 46 The legal solutions proposed in Part IV of this
238. See Susan Kerr, Postmortem Sperm Procurement: Is It Legal?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 39, 64-65 (1999).
239. Lisa V. Brock & Anna C. Mastroianni, Sperm and Egg Retrieval for Posthumous
Reproduction, in CONTEMPORARY ENDOCRINOLOGY: OFFICE ANDROLOGY 267, 274 (P. E. Patton &
D. E. Battaglia eds., 2005).
240. Id.
241. Spielman, supranote 112, at 334.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 332, 334.
245. See id. at 339-40.
246. Schiff, supra note 186, at 933-34.
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Note are proposed with the goal of enabling the living to control their
gametes even after death.247 Subpart IV.A proposes four amendments to
the 2006 UAGA that explicitly regulates PSR and PHR. 24 8 The first
amendment alters the purpose of the UAGA to include procreation
through PHR. 249 The second amendment provides a definition for the
term "gamete., 25" The third amendment permits PSR without explicit or
implied consent from male patients, but mandates that hospitals provide
251
an opportunity for them to opt out of PSR while they are still alive.
The fourth amendment mandates that a hospital ethics committee make a
recommendation as to whether or not the sperm should be authorized for
use in PHR.

22

1

Subpart IV.B proposes a legal solution that would raise awareness
of PSR and PHR and promote opportunities to consent to PSR and
PHR 3 Inspired by efforts to increase organ donation by the fields of
law and technology, this Note proposes a law that would create a section
on state driver's licenses where individuals could indicate consent to
their gametes being used in PHR. 254 This recommendation is made with
the hope that other forms of identification will be altered to include such
a section. 255 This includes, but is not limited to, military identification
cards, police identification cards, and motorcycle licenses. 6 These
efforts would target populations that are vulnerable to sudden deaths,
would provide accessible and simple opportunities to consent, and would
expose people to the possibility of PHR and PSR 7

247. See infra Part IV.
248. See infra Part W.A.
249. See infra Part IV.A.1.
250. See infra Part IV.A.2.
251. See infra Part IV.A.3. Though it is plausible to retrieve sperm from the corpse of a male
from a site other than a hospital, "[t]raditional organ donation requires a person to be in a hospital
and on a ventilator when they are pronounced brain dead." Donation Process, CTR. FOR ORGAN
RECOVERY & EDU., https://www.core.org/understanding-donation/donation-process (last visited
Feb. 3, 2019). As such, this proposed amendment for gamete donation is specific to a hospital
setting. See id. Moreover, if a person has not stored their gametes in a bank, it is most likely that
their sperm will be posthumously retrieved after a sudden and tragic death in a hospital. See supra
Parts 11.B, IH.C (discussing cases where young men whose sperm has been posthumously retrieved
have died suddenly as a result of motorcycle accidents, and bar fights, and other causes in their early
twenties and thirties).
252. See infra Part IV.A.4.
253. See infra Part IV.B.
254. See infra Part I.B.
255. See infra Part I.B.
256. See infra Part 1.B.
257. See infra Part N.B.
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A. Amendments to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
to Explicitly PermitPSR andPHR
1. "Posthumous Reproduction" as a Purpose for Making an
Anatomical Gift Prior to Death
According to the UAGA, there are four stated purposes for which a
person can make an anatomical gift during their lifetime.25 8 These four
purposes are "transplantation, therapy, research, [and] education."25 9
Spielman recommends that the NCCUSL amend the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act to indicate whether or not the Act should be
construed as to govern PSR and PHR. 260 This Note supports Spielman's
assertion but additionally recommends that the term "posthumous
reproduction" be defined within Section 2 of 2006 UAGA. 26 ' The
comments to Section 4 of the UAGA note that the four stated purposes
of an anatomical gift are not defined in the UAGA, but are "defined by
their common usage in the communities in which they apply., 262 Using
gametes in PHR is uncommon, and as such, the donation's reproductive
purpose should be defined. 263 Thus, Section 4 and Section 2 of the 2006
UAGA should be amended as follows:
SECTION 4. WHO MAY MAKE AN ANATOMICAL GIFT
BEFORE DONOR'S DEATH.
Subject to Section 8, an anatomical gift of a donor's gamete may be
made during the life of the donor for the purpose of posthumous
reproduction in the manner provided in Section 5 by:
264
(a) donor, if the donor is at least eighteen years of age.

258. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2006).
259. Id.
260. Spielman, supra note 112, at 339.
261. See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
262. UNTF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2.
263. See R. D. Orr & M. Siegler, Is Posthumous Semen Retrieval Ethically Permissible?, 28 J.
MED. ETHICS 299,299 (2002).
264. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4. This amendment is modeled after the language of
Section 4 of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act which defines when an anatomical gift can be made
for the currently stated purposes of the UAGA. Id. The age is designated at eighteen years of age
because all people aged eighteen and older can register to be an organ, eye, and tissue donor. See
Organ Donation FAQs, DEP'T MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.org/organ-donation/faqs.php
(last visited Feb. 3, 2019). Though people can become organ donors if they are younger than
eighteen, "authorization by a parent or guardian is generally necessary for individuals under
[eighteen] who have died to become an actual donor." Id.
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SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS.
"Posthumous reproduction" means a procedure which utilizes artificial
reproductive technology to use a gamete extracted from a decedent

after their death in order to conceive a child.265

2. Including a Definition of "Gametes"
in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
The critical difference between the donation of a gamete for
posthumous reproduction and the donation of a tissue to a living person
is rooted in their core biological functions and capabilities.26 6 While
most cells in the body are somatic cells, gametes are germ cells.2 67
Somatic cells comprise the non-reproductive cells of the body, including
tissue cells, nerve cells, and blood cells of the human body.268 Only germ
cells are used in sexual reproduction and undergo meiosis, and the fusion
of the sperm and egg germ cells enable the body to create a zygote. 69
The zygote then undergoes mitosis in order to produce the somatic cells,
which reproduce to create all other parts of the human body. 270 The
intrinsic difference between gametes and the organs, eyes, tissues, and
parts of the human body is that while the latter are comprised of cells, a
gamete is a cell. 271 Furthermore, while the donation of an organ, eye, or
272 If
tissue is life-sustaining, the donation of a gamete is life-creating.
PHR is to be permitted under the 2006 UAGA, "gamete" warrants its
own distinct definition from "part.",27 ' This definition must not only
acknowledge the gamete as a cell, but must also encompass the
reproductive and life-creating potential of it.274 Thus, Section 2 of the
2006 UAGA should be amended as follows:
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS:
(11) "Gamete" means a sperm or egg cell which enables human
reproduction and the creation of life. The gamete is essential to the
265. This definition was modeled after the definition of posthumous reproduction provided
earlier in this Note. See Robertson, supra note 67, at 1027.
266. See Lakna Panawala, Difference Between Somatic Cells and Gametes, PEDIAA (July 25,
2017), http://pediaa.com/difference-between-somatic-and-germ-cells.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Seeid.
272. See Schiff, supra note 186, at 932 ("Gamete donation differs from organ donation in that
it is life-creating rather than life-sustaining or life-enhancing. As a result, different interests are at
stake for the individual, the family and the state, and the legal framework appropriate
[for] ...cadaveric organs is not necessarily transferable to ...cadaveric gametes.").
273. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
274. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
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creation of all other parts of the human body, including tissues, organs,
eyes, and other parts of the body, as defined under the 2006 UAGA.2 75

3. PSR Requests Should Be Granted Unless Patient Opts Out of
Procedure When Alive
In her article, Parenthood From the Grave: Protocols for
Retrieving and Utilizing Gametesfrom the Deador Dying, Kathryn Katz
recommends that, "in order to protect the decedent's reproductive
rights," a PSR request should not be granted unless there is explicit prior
consent from the decedent to do SO. 2 7 6 However, rather than endorsing
such a restrictive view of PSR, this Note proposes that the procedure
also be granted if it is requested by the spouse, fianc6 or fiancee, or
partner of the decedent.27 7 Parents, such as Missy Evans and Rachel
Cohen, would not be permitted to make such a request, and would not be
permitted to use the posthumously retrieved sperm for PHR in order to
conceive a grandchild. 27 8 Though this Note expands on Katz's
275.

See Panawala, supra note 266; see also UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW

COMM'N 2006).

276. Katz, supra note 90, at 316.
277. See infra notes 278-85 and accompanying text. Assistive reproductive technologies
("ARTs")
make[] possible a variety of novel family situations, from donor gametes and surrogacy,
to posthumous reproduction and reproduction by single persons and gays. Some persons
condemn, and some countries ban all or some of those procedures ... [However,
b]anning those procedures will mean that persons who are otherwise competent and able
child-rearers but who due to infertility, widowhood ... or sexual orientation are not able
to reproduce with their own gametes, will not have offspring.
John A. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM.
J.L. & MED. 7, 12-13 (2004). As such, this Note acknowledges and embraces the use of ART in
order to enable gay couples' abilities to procreate through PSR and PHR. See supra text
accompanying notes 246-57.
278. See James, supra note 188; see also Greenberg, supra note 95. In order for a parent to
achieve PHR and create a grandchild, the parent must hire a surrogate. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra
note 95 (detailing Rachel Cohen's hiring of a gestational surrogate to be inseminated with Keivan's
sperm and to carry her grandchild). Though there are countries where gestational surrogacy is legal,
such as Israel, in the United States, both gestational and traditional surrogacy are not legal in every
state. Surrogacy Laws, SURROGACY EXPERIENCE, http://www.thesurrogacyexperience.com/u-ssurrogacy-law-by-state.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2019). For instance, New York law forbids
surrogacy, and those who engage in a surrogacy contract can be fined or be found guilty of a felony.
Id. As such, the current legal climate only permits certain parents in certain states to engage in PHR
to conceive a grandchild. 1d; see also Surrogacy in Israel, NEW FAMILY,
http://www.newfamily.org.il/en/surrogacy-in-israel (last visited Feb. 3, 2019). One might argue that
if a couple seeks to enforce a surrogacy contract in a state where surrogacy is not legal, the drafters
of the contract could use a choice of law clause in order to state shop and utilize the laws of a state
where the practice is legal. See Joseph F. Morrissey, Surrogacy: The Process, the Law, and the
Contracts, 51 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 459, 486 (2015). However, this action comes with risks, as the
state court could deem the clause to be unenforceable and could hold that choosing the law of a
different state is against public policy interests. Id. Nevertheless, it is possible to proceed in states
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recommendation as to who should be able to request the posthumous
retrieval of sperm, this Note agrees with Katz's assertion that "[n]o right
of parents to control the279reproductive decisions of their adult progeny is
recognized by the law.,
This Note also endorses an "opt-out" rather than an "opt-in"
procedure for two additional reasons. 280 First, sperm is only viable for
PHR for a limited amount of time after death-it must be retrieved
between twenty-four to thirty-six hours after death to be successful in
PHR.2 8' If the patient's intent is determined to be that he would want his
sperm used in PHR, then that sperm will have been retrieved at the
optimal time, increasing the likelihood that PHR attempts will be
successful. 28 2 If it is revealed that the deceased would not have wanted
his sperm to be used for PHR, the collected sample can simply be
destroyed.283 Second, the granting of PSR can be accomplished through
much less intrusive procedures, which do not have the capability of
being as "invasive, destructive, and disfiguring" as those involving the
harvesting of organs, eyes, and tissues from the body. 2 4 Section 9 of the
UAGA should be amended to include:
SECTION 9. WHO MAY MAKE ANATOMICAL GIFT OF
DECEDENT'S BODY OR PART.
(1) In the event that the decedent, or a party who is the spouse, fiancd
or fiancee, or partner of the decedent makes the request for the
posthumous retrieval of sperm, the request will be granted without
need for a showing of explicit or implied consent to the procedure.
(2) If, when brought to the hospital, the male patient is incapable of
revoking consent to the procedure due to his incapacitation, the
absence of his express consent will not prevent his spouse, fiancd or
fiancee, or partner from obtaining the sperm.
(3) Hospitals must provide information to all male patients that their
sperm could be extracted from their body postmortem and used for
PHR if his spouse, fianc6 or fiancee, or partner requests the
posthumous sperm retrieval procedure. The hospital must then provide
the opportunity to opt out of consenting to this procedure.
(4) Before the hospital transfers the posthumously retrieved sperm to
the requestor, the ethics committee of the hospital where the procedure

where surrogacy agreements are enforceable. Id.
279. Katz, supra note 90, at 307.
280. See infra notes 281-85 and accompanying text.
281. Bahm, Karkazis & Magnus, supra note 24, at 839.
282. See id.
283. See Sperm Storage, CAMBRIDGE lVF, http://www.cambridge-ivf.org.uk/patients/
andrology-services/sperm-storage (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
284. Katz, supra note 90, at 306.
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has taken place shall make a recommendation as to whether or not
decedent would have intended his sperm to be used for PHR. If
requestor is not satisfied with the decision of the ethics committee,
decision can be appealed in a court of law.
(5) The requestor must take full responsibility for the storing of
sperm.285

the
the
the
the

4. Determining Whether or Not Posthumously Retrieved Sperm
Should Be Used in PHR
In the United States, hospital ethics committees have been
established to handle and contemplate medical issues that present both
medical and ethical predicaments to their staffs. 286 Though these
committees were virtually nonexistent throughout the majority of the
twentieth century, by the late 1990s, more than ninety percent of
hospitals had instituted them. 287 The rapid growth of these institutions
was heavily influenced by the emergence of specific ethical issues, such
as access to dialysis, within hospital systems. 288 Now, the Joint
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations requires
that hospitals have a "mechanism" for handling ethical issues in order
for the hospital itself to be an accredited institution. 289 This Note
recommends that the ethics committee include, like the committee that
promulgated the Cornell Guidelines, a psychologist, a legal expert, a
reproductive technology expert, an institutional representative, a male
infertility expert, and a medical ethicist.2 9 °
285. See UNF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (UNF. LAW COMM'N 2006). This amendment is
influenced by the Limited-Role and Family-Centered Protocols advanced in the Stanford Protocols.
See Bahm, Karkazis & Magnus, supra note 24, at 842 fig. 1 (proposing both that the wife or partner
of the decedent can make the request for the sperm and that the requestor must take responsibility,
including financial responsibility, for the storage of the retrieved sperm).
286. See Mark P. Aulisio, Why Did Hospital Ethics Committees Emerge in the US?, 18 AM.
MED. Ass'N J. ETHICS 546, 546 (2016).

287. Id.
288. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: The
Procedurally Fair Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 31 CAwBELL L. REV. 257, 261-65
(2009).
289. See Aulisio, supra note 286, at 550 ("[I]n 1992, the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) changed its recommendation that hospitals
have some 'mechanism' for dealing with ethial issues in clinical care to a requirement."). The Joint
Commission "accredits approximately 4,477 general, pediatric, long term acute, psychiatric,
rehabilitation and specialty hospitals." Facts About the Hospital Accreditation, JOINT COMM'N
(Sept.
12,
2018),
https://www.jointcommission.org/facts about hospital-accreditation.
"Approximately 77 percent of the nation's hospitals are currently accredited by The Joint
Commission, and approximately 88% percent of hospitals that are accredited in the United States
are accredited by The Joint Commission." Id.
290. See New York Hospital Guidelinesfor Considerationof Requestsfor Post-Mortem Sperm
Retrieval, supra note 165. This Note acknowledges, however, that there are a variety of
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The issues surrounding PSR and PHR are legal, medical, and
ethical. 291 Thus, this Note recommends the 2006 UAGA be amended to

require the hospital's ethics committee where the decedent's sperm is
retrieved to assess whether or not he would have willed his sperm to be

used in PHR and to make a recommendation as to whether or not it
should be used in posthumous reproduction.292 A requestor must offer
evidence to the ethics committee to show that the deceased would have

willed his sperm to be used posthumously. 293 The most compelling
offering of proof would be of prior explicit consent, which could
manifest in the form of a will, an advance directive, or a contract.29 4
However, other evidence, such as testimony from the requestor and/or
other interested parties, video footage, phone conversations, and text
messages could be used to demonstrate proof of intent.295 Furthermore,
those who have conflicting accounts of the decedent's intent for his
sperm would be permitted to discuss this with the committee before the
committee renders its recommendation. 296 Once the recommendation of
this committee has been rendered, if either party is not satisfied with it,
the decision can be appealed in a court of law. 297
This Note recommends the hearing of these matters first by an
ethics committee for a number of reasons. 298 First, an ethics committee
could be readily available to the requestor and other interested parties,
and this could prevent the requestor from experiencing long courtroom
professionals who can compose a hospital ethics committee.
291. Bahadur, supra note 82, at 2775.
292. See infra notes 293-96 and accompanying text (discussing features of the mandated ethics
committee hearing). This amendment to the 2006 UAGA was included in the suggested revisions to
Section 9 in Part IV.A.3 of this Note. See supra Part IV.A.3 ("(4) Before the hospital transfers the
posthumously retrieved sperm to the requestor, the ethics committee of the hospital where the
procedure has taken place shall hold a hearing to determine whether or not the decedent would have
intended his sperm to be used for PHR.").
293. See infra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(disclosing that William Kane expressed his intent in a "Specimen Storage Agreement" and in his
will).
295. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 105 (discussing that video evidence and testimony were
introduced to support the assertion that Keivan would have wanted to have children posthumously).
296. See, e.g., Hall v. Fertility Inst. of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348, 1350 (La. Ct. App.
1994) (highlighting that the decedent's family members were able to submit affidavits at trial that
contradicted his girlfriend's account of his wishes for his sperm).
297. Cf R. Landau, Posthumous Sperm Retrievalfor the Purposeof Later Insemination or IVF
in Israel: An Ethical and Psychosocial Critique, 19 HuM. REPROD. 1952, 1952-54 (2004)
(describing the Israel Attorney General's recommendations that though "[p]ermission to use the
sperm is to be determined on a case by case basis in a court of law, in keeping with the man's
dignity and 'presumed wishes.' . . . [The court should] appoint a social worker to provide an
objective report assessing the deceased man's wishes").
298. See infra notes 299-302 and accompanying text.
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delays and from acquiring an abundance of legal fees while trying to
support their case.299 Secondly, the ethics committee, comprised of
members of different professions and expertise, could furnish the
requestor with more information and perspectives about their choice to
proceed with PHR.3 ° ° Third, current guidelines for PSR recommend a
waiting period before the sperm is used in PHR.3 °1 The institution of an
ethics committee hearing would generate a waiting period during which
a requestor could not only gather evidence to establish the decedent's
30 2
intent, but also could consider her choice to proceed with PHR.
As stated previously, the most compelling evidence in favor of a
decedent's intent to use their sperm for PHR would be if the decedent
indicated explicit prior consent to the procedure before their death. 30 3
However, most young people do not engage in advance care planning,
and it is unlikely that they would have indicated explicit prior consent
through a will. 3" Subpart IV.B of this Note recommends the repurposing
of current law created to ameliorate the shortage of organ donors in the
United States that would create a method and opportunity for a person to
indicate their consent to PHR.3 °5
B. Laws to Create Opportunitiesfor Expressions of Consent
A lack of available organ donors throughout the United States has
led state legislatures to create laws in an attempt to boost organ donor
enrollment numbers.30 6 In 2012, the New York State Legislature passed
"Lauren's Law."30 7 Lauren's Law requires those applying for a driver's
license to check off a box indicating whether they would like to register
299. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 668-69 (N.J. 1976) (quoting Karen Teel, The
Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 8-9
(1975)).
300. See, e.g., New York Hospital Guidelinesfor Considerationof Requests for Post-Mortem
Sperm Retrieval, supra note 170 (describing the different professions composing the committee that
drafted the Cornell Guidelines).
301. See id.("Prior to sperm retrieval, the deceased man's wife should consent to a one year
waiting period before the use of the retrieved sperm."); see also Bahm, Karkazis & Magnus, supra
note 24, at 842 fig.1 ("Sperm cannot be used for 1 year after retrieval during which time the
wife/partner must undergo psychological counseling.").
302. Many women decide not to go through with posthumous reproduction, though they
request that posthumous sperm retrieval take place. See James, supra note 188 ("Only about 1 in
500 requests [of posthumously retrieved sperm] are utilized.").
303. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
305. See infra Part IV.B.
306. See Allison Dunne, Lauren 's Law in NY Becomes Permanent, Focuses on Organ
Donation, WAMC: MIDDAY MAG. (Oct. 28, 2017), http://wamc.org/post/laurens-law-ny-becomespermanent-focuses-organ-donations; see also N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 502 (2018).
307. Dunne, supra note 306.
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as an organ donor.3 °8 Furthermore, on the back side of the New York
State Driver's License, there is a box that a licensee can check off to
consent to making an anatomical gift, and that consent is affirmed with a
signature.3 °9 New York has a low number of organ donor enrollees and a
lengthy list of people waiting for organ transplants.3 1 ° Lauren's Law is a
part of New York State's efforts to increase organ donation efforts, and
in 2017, more than 84,000 New Yorkers registered for the Donate Life
Registry through these expanded outreach efforts.3 11 Nearly all states
throughout the United States have permanent icons that can indicate
organ donor status on a driver's license-the organ donor icon is on at
least forty-seven state driver's licenses in the United States.3 12 This Note
proposes that legislation such as Lauren's Law also be amended to
permit licensees to indicate whether or not the cardholder consents to
posthumous gamete retrieval and subsequent PHR.313
There are several benefits to amending laws, like Lauren's Law, to
allow someone to indicate their desire to be a gamete donor.3 14 First, an
indication of an intent to be a donor on the registration for a license or
the license itself provides a space where the decedent could indicate the
desire to become a parent posthumously.3" 5 This indication of consent on
a driver's license could serve as affirmative evidence at a hospital ethics
committee hearing.31 6 Secondly, this would generate awareness of PHR
and PSR available to a large portion of the United States population-in
2009, there were 210 million licensed drivers, and this number has
increased since then.317 Third, it could lead to the initiation of
conversations about PSR and PHR, and even if the decedent doesn't
ultimately decide to indicate a preference on their license, the
conversations could provide the decedent's spouse or significant other
308. Id.
309.

New York's Organ Donation Rate Still Low, N.Y.S. ASSEMBLY, http://assembly.state.

ny.us/mem/William-A-Barclay/story/61907 (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
310. Id.
311.

New York State Aims to Increase Organ Donation, US NEWS (Oct. 16, 2017, 1:42 PM),

https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/new-york/articles/2017-10-16/new-york-state-aims-toincrease-organ-donation.
312. See Jessie Halladay, Organ Donor Icon Now on Licenses in 47 States, USA TODAY (Jan.
22, 2013, 4:03 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/22/organ-donationdrivers-licenses/1855871.
313. See infra notes 314-35 and accompanying text. Though this Note focuses on the
posthumous sperm retrieval for posthumous reproduction, it also endorses this solution as a method
for expression of consent to posthumous egg retrieval for reproduction.
314. See infra notes 315-35 and accompanying text.
315. See supra Part IV.A.4.
316. See supra Part IV.A.4.
317. Our Nation's Highways: 2011, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. (Nov. 7,
2014), https://www.flhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/pubs/hf/pll 1028/chapter4.cfm.
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with an idea of their wishes for their gametes.3 18 Fourthly, this initiative
could be adopted in other fields outside of the law.3 19 This is exemplified
in Donate Life America's partnership with Apple.32 ° The iOS 10 Apple
Software for the iPhone updates the Health application to allow people
to sign up to be an organ, eye, and tissue donor.3 2' This application
makes it easier for people to register as an organ donor and to have
access to information about becoming an organ donor. It also enables
people to "carry their decision with them wherever they go," and these
applications could be updated to include a preference for gamete
donation.32 2 Finally, this solution could be expanded to other types of
identification, including, but not limited to, police identification cards,
military identification cards, and firefighter identification cards.32 3
V. CONCLUSION

In the United States, PSR and PHR are procedures that "cr[y] out
for guidelines."32' 4 The enactment of legislation governing PSR and PHR
procedures is legitimately warranted at the level of public policy because
of its widespread potential impact on the living.325 Undoubtedly, this
legislation would serve the interests of women seeking to retrieve and
use the sperm of a deceased male in PHR procedures.32 6 It would
simultaneously serve the interests of other living people and institutions
that are involved in both the PSR and PHR decision-making process and
procedures.3 27 This legislation would benefit hospitals and doctors across
the nation.328 Both have grappled with the legal, moral, and ethical
questions surrounding PSR and PHR without much, if any at all, input
from the government.32 9 Additionally, the legislation would function to
318. See, e.g., Brockes, supra note 85 (noting that after Stephen Blood became aware of
posthumous reproduction and posthumous sperm retrieval from reading a magazine, he indicated to
her that he would consent to PSR or PHR).
319. See infra notes 320-23 and accompanying text.
320. Apple & Donate Life America Bring National Organ Donor Registration to iPhone,
APPLE (July 5, 2016), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2016/07/apple-and-donate-life-americabring-organ-donation-to-iphone.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. These solutions could be applied to people such as Officer Liu or Sergeant Keivan Cohen.
See supra Part ll.C-D (discussing how each man died in the line of duty of their respective
professions).
324. Katz, supra note 90, at 315.
325. See infra notes 326-31 and accompanying text.
326. Evans, supra note 94, at 155.
327. See infra notes 328-3 land accompanying text.
328. Evans, supra note 94, at 155.
329. See Katz, supra note 90, at 316.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss2/11

36

Krebs: Any Man Can Be a Father, but Should a Dead Man Be a Dad: An Appro

2018]

SHOULD A DEAD MAN BE A DAD?

"relieve hospitals and doctors of unnecessary legal liability by outlining
the appropriate policies and procedures that hospital ethics committees
should follow."33 Furthermore, the "very process of drafting, debating
and passing" PSR and PHR legislation would benefit the American
society at large through raising awareness of and allowing people to
become more informed about PSR and PHR procedures.3 3 However,
legislation is not only warranted at the level of public policy because it
protects the interests of the living-it is also warranted because it
protects the interests of the dead.332
Schiff notes that "[d]espite the finality of death, the relationship of
the living does not altogether cease with the grave[,] [and] [t]o some
extent, it continues on through the actions of the living as they carry out
' The last wishes of the dead previously
the last wishes of the dead."333
involved the disposal of the deceased's body and the execution of their
will.334 Now, reproductive technology has transformed these wishes into
something much more-the ability to defy death.335 As medical
reproductive technology constantly advances, the United States legal
system must attempt to keep up with it. 336 The number of requests for
PSR have been rising and have been more frequently granted by
physicians.3 37 It is likely that this "upward trend 338 will continue, and
thus, it is imperative that the law takes steps to ensure that the living
who are carrying out the "wishes" of the deceased are actually doing so
when requesting PSR and PHR procedures.339 The hope of this Note is
that through the enactment of the legal solutions proposed in Part IV, the
living will be able to strengthen "the special relational trust [that the
deceased has] placed in the[ir] hands" when making the decision
whether or not their sperm should be retrieved through PSR and used in
future PHR.34 ° As Schiff states, "[t]here is perhaps no greater way that

330. Evans, supra note 94, at 155.
331. Id.
332. See infra notes 333-41 and accompanying text.
333. Schiff, supra note 186, at 965.
334. See supra Part III.C.
335. See supra Part II.
336. See Williams, supra note 20, at 203 ("It is inevitable that medicine will always be a step
ahead of the law, but the least the legal community can do is attempt to keep up with the modem
advances in technology.").
337. See Joshua D. Hurwitz & Francis R. Batzer, Posthumous Sperm Procurement:Demand
and Concerns, 59 OBSTETRICAL GYNECOLOGICAL SURV. 806, 806 (2004) (finding that between

1997 and 2004, the documented requests for posthumous sperm retrieval increased by sixty percent
and that the approval rate of such requests rose to sixty-eight percent).
338. Evans, supra note 94, at 154-55.
339. SeesupraPartIV.
340. See Schiff, supranote 186, at 965.
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the living can honor the dead than by safeguarding the pre-death
intentions of those who are now deceased, in a matter as fundamental
as procreation.
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